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SECURITY COUNCIL COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED BY RESOLUTION 421 (1977) CONCERNING THE QUESTION OF SOUTH AFRICA

SUMMARY RECORD OF THE FIRST PART (PUBLIC)* OF THE 25th MEETING

Held at Headquarters, New York,
on Wednesday, 5 March 1980, at 3 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. OUHAROU (Niger)

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* The summary record of the second part (closed) of the meeting appears as document S/AC.20/SR.25/Add.1.

The meeting was called to order at 3.35 p.m.

ADOPTION OF THE AGENDA

The agenda was adopted.

HEARING OF MR. ABDUL MINTY, DIRECTOR, WORLD CAMPAIGN AGAINST MILITARY AND NUCLEAR COLLABORATION WITH SOUTH AFRICA

The CHAIRMAN recalled that on 20 February 1980 Mr. Minty had sent him a telegram announcing the publication of a study on South Africa's nuclear capability and requesting a hearing by the Committee so that he could present new information. Document S/AC.20/NGO/80/1 contained the text of that telegram. On 26 February the Committee had decided to invite Mr. Minty to address it. He welcomed Mr. Minty to the meeting; Mr. Minty maintained close co-operation with the Committee and was known for his militant stand against apartheid.

Mr. MINTY (Director, World Campaign against Military and Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa)* expressed the hope that the World Campaign and the Committee would work together to ensure that the responsibilities of the Committee were more effectively discharged and the objectives of the World Campaign were more quickly realized. He hoped that a working partnership would develop in order to ensure that Security Council resolution 421 (1977) was fully implemented and that the arms embargo against South Africa was strengthened in such a way as to deny all forms of direct and indirect assistance to the military, security and police establishment of the Pretoria régime.

* This statement has been given full coverage in the summary record in accordance with the decision taken by the Committee during the meeting.

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The World Campaign had just published a booklet containing a study of South Africa's nuclear capability based on the papers and proceedings of the Nuclear Seminar held in London in February 1979 by the Anti-Apartheid Movement in co-operation with the Special Committee against Apartheid. Copies would be made available to all the members of the Committee. The study had already received a favourable response in various countries, and several experts and Governments had welcomed it as a useful and much needed publication. The World Campaign hoped that the members of this Committee, and indeed all Members of the United Nations, would study it carefully so that they would be more fully informed about South Africa's dangerous nuclear-weapon capability and realize the importance and urgency of ending all forms of nuclear collaboration with apartheid South Africa.

In October 1979 the world had heard reports of a possible nuclear explosion carried out in the atmosphere in the region of South Africa. Most experts and scientists were now of the view that the test had taken place and all the available evidence pointed to South Africa having been responsible for it.

That news, together with South Africa's preparations for a nuclear explosion in the Kalahari Desert in August 1977, had brought home to the world community, in a dramatic way, the dangerous nuclear-weapon capability of the Pretoria régime. Yet the world community was looking in vain for some action on the part of South Africa's nuclear partners to ensure that no further assistance was provided by them to help develop the nuclear capability of the apartheid régime. Indeed, it would be true to say that none of South Africa's traditional nuclear partners had taken any action since August 1977 or the reporting of the explosion on 22 September to deny nuclear equipment, material, technology, expertise and know-how to South Africa.

The Anti-Apartheid Movement in London, since the early 1960s and more vigorously in the 1970s, urged an end to all forms of nuclear collaboration with South Africa. It had done that because it knew of the nuclear-weapon ambitions of the Pretoria régime and also because of the inherent threat to international peace and security presented by the system of apartheid and white domination. Yet throughout those two decades the world had seen the nuclear partnership of countries such as the United Kingdom, France, the

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Federal Republic of Germany, the United States of America, Belgium and Switzerland, as well as others including Canada, the Netherlands, Japan and Israel, develop with South Africa to such an extent that there was no longer any doubt about Pretoria's nuclear-weapon capability. Yet, there was as yet no action by any of those countries to stop the development of an apartheid bomb by Pretoria. Security Council resolution 418 (1977) clearly stated that no country should assist South Africa to develop its nuclear-weapon capability. Yet, by all accounts, South Africa now had a nuclear explosive, and so the Committee must act very quickly, as a matter of supreme urgency, to ensure that the nuclear-weapon capability of the Pretoria régime was not enhanced any further.

The Committee needed to establish how South Africa had acquired that capability. The study referred to earlier was a preliminary one, and much more work needed to be done. It must be asked which countries, institutions, corporations, para-statals and individuals had assisted South Africa. The Committee needed to examine all types of involvement, as well as what explanations were given by all the parties for that kind of involvement. It also had to look at what opposition there had been over the years to that type of collaboration and from whom the opposition had come and why. Above all, it had to find out what response there had been to that opposition over the years. The Committee also needed to examine South Africa's external links with bodies such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). It had to establish what benefits South Africa derived from membership in that international body; what had been the nature and degree of scientific exchanges, conferences, sharing of documents and scientific knowledge that South Africa had achieved as a result of its membership in IAEA; and how many and what type of contracts IAEA had provided to South Africa over the past 20 years. He personally had visited Vienna some months previously and had asked for information on the subject, but unfortunately he had so far not received any. He hoped that the Committee's efforts would be more successful. It was also necessary to find out how many South African scientists had been directly or indirectly sponsored by IAEA in that period, at various institutions and in various countries, and how many IAEA officials and members of its administrative staff, including the Director-General, had visited South Africa and for what purpose. It was necessary to know all that and more in order to judge accurately the benefits received by South Africa as a result of its membership in IAEA.

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The World Campaign urged South Africa's exclusion from IAEA, but several Western countries were opposed to such a move. Already, apartheid South Africa's representatives had been denied participation in the New Delhi Conference of IAEA in 1979, and the pressure for exclusion would no doubt grow. So as to have an informed debate on the subject, all the relevant information was needed; and the Committee should address the above questions and others to IAEA and to all other relevant bodies.

The Committee should also ask the members of the Nuclear Suppliers' Group - the so-called London Club - what efforts they had made to prohibit all nuclear collaboration with South Africa. What was each member's position in that regard and had any of them raised the question in the Group so far? What had been the response of the other members? How did the Group think that South Africa had acquired its nuclear-weapon capability? Would the Group at its next meeting consider acting jointly in order to prohibit all forms of nuclear collaboration with South Africa?

Instead of ending all nuclear collaboration with apartheid South Africa, some of the major Western Powers claimed that they needed to continue their nuclear links in order to persuade South Africa to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The World Campaign rejected that approach, because in all the years that efforts were apparently being made to persuade South Africa to sign the Treaty nuclear collaboration had in fact increased - just as over two decades of persuasion to abandon apartheid since the Sharpeville massacre in 1960 had seen only increased oppression and an intensification of the apartheid system. Indeed, although South Africa had not acceded to the NPT, it had in fact received more nuclear assistance than many countries which had signed the NPT. How and why had that happened? Furthermore, Prime Minister Vorster had explained a few years previously that if South Africa did sign the NPT, it would expect even more substantial nuclear collaboration than at present. Thus, in effect, the manoeuvres centring on the NPT resulted in South Africa's nuclear capability being enhanced rather than reduced.

A related issue was that of full-scope safeguards, and the Committee had before it certain proposals from the delegation of Norway to secure full-scope

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safeguards in South Africa. The World Campaign did not believe that the answer to South Africa's dangerous nuclear-weapon capability was to concentrate exclusively on full-scope safeguards as an alternative to prohibiting all forms of nuclear collaboration with South Africa. However, it was important to establish why the Western nuclear partners of South Africa, including the Federal Republic of Germany and France, had not so far required such safeguards from South Africa. The Committee should find out whether they and other Powers had asked for full-scope safeguards from South Africa, and why, in the absence of South Africa's compliance, they had continued to supply and were still supplying nuclear equipment and material to South Africa.

Since it was known that South Africa had nuclear-weapon capability and Security Council resolution 418 (1977) provided that no assistance should be given to South Africa in developing nuclear weapons, all States had a special responsibility to secure, as a minimum, full-scope safeguards. What more evidence did they need about South Africa's nuclear-weapon ambitions before they imposed such safeguards - or would they only agree to do so several years after South Africa had acquired all the technology and equipment that it required?

The World Campaign noted that United States legislation on nuclear supplies would come into effect within a few days, and it hoped that the United States President would not authorize any exemption from that legislation for South Africa. It urged a public declaration from the United States regarding South Africa, so that it was clear in advance that the United States would ensure that nuclear collaboration with South Africa was not permitted under that legislation. The World Campaign felt that those measures were not enough because there were still major loop-holes in the safeguards procedure. But at least they were a minimum effort that should have been forthcoming from the Western countries in past years, and it was legitimate to ask why those countries were continuing that form of collaboration despite the absence of assurances from South Africa. It would be interesting to see the level of commitment of those Powers to help deny South Africa an apartheid bomb as demonstrated by the kind of action they took in the next few days following the implementation of the United States legislation.

Although the United States legislation was concerned with the general question of proliferation and not with South Africa itself, if legislation of that type was introduced for general protection and was thought to be necessary by the United States and other Powers, those Powers needed to go very much further in relation to South Africa because of its known capability and its known ambitions.

In that connexion, the United States Westinghouse link with the French Framatome Company should also be prohibited, in the same way as the United States legislation which applied to the embargo on conventional weapons also applied to third parties so that indirect routes were not used to pass on United States technology and expertise to South Africa. In consultations he had had with members of the State Department two days previously he had been told that United States legislation did not prohibit that kind of co-operation through third parties.

He hoped that the Committee would study the World Campaign's booklet carefully and make appropriate representations to the Governments concerned on the issues raised in it.

South Africa claimed that it was part of the over-all Western monitoring system to detect nuclear explosions and that it co-operated closely with the United Kingdom and the United States in that field. What were the implications of that relationship and what equipment and expertise were provided to South Africa on that basis? Did not that role for South Africa improve its ability to disguise a low-yield nuclear explosion?

The World Campaign believed that all the available evidence, including the recording by the Vela satellite, the presence of South African naval ships in the region of the testing area at the relevant time, and the disturbance of the ionosphere, which was so consistent with the Vela recording, pointed to a South African explosion. It believed that there had been a very sophisticated low-yield explosion in the atmosphere, and it drew attention to the fact that South Africa was a signatory to the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty. It therefore awaited appropriate action from South Africa's nuclear partners on the basis of the apparent violation of that Treaty by South Africa.

On the basis of the available evidence, including the report of the United Nations nuclear seminar of February 1979, the publication just issued by the World

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Campaign and other public information, there was a need for the Security Council itself to meet urgently to consider that question and adopt mandatory measures to prohibit all forms of nuclear collaboration with South Africa; action in that field should cover the issue of uranium supplies from South Africa and Namibia as well, because the uranium trade gave Pretoria considerable bargaining and blackmailing power and was related to the nuclear weapon issue.

But in a sense Governments did not need to await the adoption of resolutions in the Security Council or elsewhere before taking action; the World Campaign urged all States to do everything possible to stop development of the apartheid bomb immediately. All scientific and other exchanges must also be stopped, since South Africa relied heavily on such collaboration.

There had been many reports over the past years about close nuclear collaboration between Israel and South Africa, which Israel had denied. The World Campaign had reliable information to the effect that Major-General Amos Horev, former chief scientist of the Israeli Defence Ministry, who was now President of Technion, Israel's Institute of Technology, had made a so-called contact trip to South Africa in November 1979 and was to have had talks with South African scientists as well as the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research, which was responsible for much defence research and development conducted for the South African Government. He had been reported by the South Africa press as saying: "I am still involved with Israel's nuclear research through the Technion's Department of Nuclear Energy." Israel should be asked immediately about that visit and whether Mr. Horev had also visited Pelindaba and Valindaba. It should also be asked how many scientists from Israel had been on such visits over the past 10 years, how many South Africans had made similar visits to Israel, and what was the state of nuclear collaboration between Israel and South Africa in all fields? The world needed to know the facts in order to establish the credibility of repeated reports about Israeli and South African collaboration in the nuclear field. Those questions needed to be put to the other nuclear partners of South Africa as well - the Western countries.

A great deal of the concern about South Africa's nuclear weapon capability related to its secret uranium enrichment plant at Valindaba, developed in close

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co-operation with companies in the Federal Republic of Germany and not prohibited by the Bonn Government. He had recently seen a transcript of a television film shown in West Germany in November 1979 when the Secretary of State of the Ministry of Economic Affairs, Mr. Martin Grüner, had stated that there was no nuclear co-operation with South Africa, and in the same television film, there was a statement by a spokesman of the firm Varian MAT confirming that instruments for uranium hexafluoride isotope analysis and control system had been provided to South Africa and that more were to be delivered in 1980. The instrument was used almost exclusively for nuclear enrichment plants. Since then, in January 1980, in reply to a parliamentary question, Mr. Grüner had stated that isotope-measuring instruments, which were not only used to determine the isotope mixing ratio of uranium hexafluoride in uranium enrichment plants but were also useful for a vide range of other purposes, were not subject to export permission; therefore a negative certificate had been issued to enable the equipment to be exported to South Africa. He had further stated to Parliament that, as a result of discussions with other Western countries, the Bonn Government was considering the wider implications of non-proliferation affecting that item and was therefore preparing a decree in order to alter the legislation so that in future those items would not be exported so easily.

In his opinion, it was a most serious admission on the part of the Federal Republic of Germany to say that it had in effect permitted the export of equipment designed for the enrichment of uranium in South Africa; it was clear that the authorities had not prohibited the export of such equipment.

The Federal Republic of Germany should let the Committee know immediately why the export of those items to South Africa was not prohibited, and it would also be interesting to know to what other uses that particular item could be put besides its use in enrichment plants, because the company concerned claimed that it could not be used for any other purpose but a nuclear enrichment plant. Also, in the light of that revelation, it was necessary to find out, and document, what other equipment that might be used in such plants had been supplied during the past 10 years by the Federal Republic of Germany to the South African régime.

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The World Campaign had recently noted South African advertising in the British and even the Swedish press for nuclear scientists and engineers, and, no doubt, it was actively recruiting in other countries as well for its nuclear programme. In Britain, the Imperial College in London had in fact been training South African nuclear scientists on a special master's course programme. Some of the Governments concerned claimed, when the World Campaign made representations to them, that they had no legal powers to prevent that form of recruitment. If that was so, they should enact the required legislation to put a stop to that form of collaboration.

Some countries claimed, as they had done before, that their co-operation was not for nuclear weapons. The World Campaign had always rejected the distinction between so-called co-operation for peaceful purposes and co-operation for nuclear weapons purposes. In the light of the information now available about South Africa's nuclear capability, even the artificial distinction that was often made lost all validity.

The World Campaign welcomed the establishment of the Group of Experts on South Africa's Nuclear Plan and Capability; it had offered the Group its full co-operation and had given to the Group all the information it had. The work of the Group was of vital importance, and the World Campaign would await its report with great interest. Nevertheless, the Committee and the Security Council should not postpone their own action until that report was issued. Urgent action must be taken on the available evidence.

With regard to Case No. 7, the Plessey case, he noted that the Committee had not received any satisfactory response from the three Governments concerned. He recalled that on 1 August 1979, on behalf of the Anti-Apartheid Movement, he had written to the United Kingdom Foreign Secretary telling him that Plessey Ltd. appeared to have made a contract with South Africa in order to supply some radar equipment to the Pretoria régime. The World Campaign had learnt that Plessey was to supply South Africa with a radar system which included a digital computer of United States origin. A few days later, at the Commonwealth Conference in Lusaka, he had made further representations on the new information both to Mrs. Thatcher and to Lord Carrington, and Mrs. Thatcher had subsequently promised a full review of the case. On 3 September Lord Carrington had written to him stating that the United Kingdom Government would not interfere with the contract which had been entered

into previously and had also confirmed that South African defence personnel were being trained by Plessey in the United Kingdom on that particular contract. He had asked Lord Carrington to intervene on behalf of the United States - whose policy on computers was being violated by a United Kingdom company, so that it was proper for the United Kingdom to take steps to prevent United States policy from being violated by Plessey - and Lord Carrington had advised him in a letter that the question of the computer was a matter between the United States Government, the United States computer company concerned and Plessey Ltd. In the light of that response, he had immediately written to President Carter asking that the United States Government should intervene immediately in order to stop the export of the computer equipment. Unfortunately there had been no response as yet, despite the fact that he had been contacting the United States embassies in Europe almost on a weekly basis.

Because of the urgency and the importance of the matter, he had arranged a meeting with the State Department at Washington, two days previously, but at that meeting no further information had been provided except an indication that the Department of Commerce was proceeding with its inquiries and that the officials in the State Department were bound by law not to release any information on the subject.

A special complication in the case was that Digital had a subsidiary in Ireland, and the World Campaign's representations to the Irish Government had not produced any adequate response. He noted that the Committee also had not received information from those Governments.

It seemed that everyone was taking a very long time to establish the facts about the case and that perhaps the intention was to wait for the system to be delivered to South Africa - if it had not already been supplied - before admitting to certain mistakes, misunderstandings or oversights.

He urged the Committee to give the matter priority attention and to ask the Governments concerned urgently for an explanation, with a view to ensuring at least that United States legislation was not violated and that the delivery of the computer in question was prohibited.

The implications of the deal were particularly serious because the radar system enabled South Africa to guide and control its aircraft beyond its borders for

surveillance purposes as well as for attacks against African front-line States. Why would any Government wish to provide Pretoria with equipment of that nature at a time when developments in South Africa were so critical?

The United Kingdom claimed that it did not violate the arms embargo or its obligations under the arms embargo. The World Campaign maintained that it violated the embargo fundamentally, and it hoped that the Committee would also investigate the matter. He would leave the file of the correspondence on the subject so that the Committee might reach its own judgement.

Ireland and the United States should act immediately to stop the delivery, if it had not already taken place, and the World Campaign looked forward to the prosecution of the offending party.

In the light of that case, the World Campaign had asked Lord Carrington how many other contracts of that nature existed between South Africa and United Kingdom companies. It had been told that the United Kingdom Government did not disclose such information. The Committee should ask that question as well, because it had to know the facts from the Governments concerned rather than rely on information which reached it by chance and only occasionally. The world community did not know the nature and the extent of contracts of that type, which probably violated the arms embargo, because of the secrecy which surrounded them.

Italy had indicated in its reply to the Committee that it had supplied aircraft, components and engines and provided licences to South Africa until 1972. He recalled that in 1979 in his testimony to the Committee he had asked why Italy kept referring to the year 1972 when the embargo has been in operation since 1963, and in 1963 the Italian Government had stated that it was complying with it. From the facts presented by the Italian Government to the Committee it seemed very clear that the Italian Government had been misleading the United Nations and the international community. That was a serious charge, and he would therefore quote from what the Italian representative had said at the time and subsequently. With reference to paragraph 3 of Security Council resolution 181, of 7 August 1963, Italy had stated on 10 October 1963 that prior to the adoption of that resolution:

> "The Italian authorities have followed the practice of withholding licences for the sale to South Africa of arms that might be used to enforce the policy of apartheid".

Then, later on, with reference to paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 182, of 4 December 1963, the Italian representative had stated, on 27 March 1964:

> "Following Security Council resolution S/5471 of 4 December 1963, the Italian Government has ultimately confirmed the prohibition of sales and shipment of arms and military equipment to South Africa, including all types of ammunition, military vehicles, equipment and materials for the manufacture and maintenance of arms and ammunition, as well as spare parts and accessories for the above-mentioned materials unless intended for civilian purposes."

Thus, it was very clear from those statements that Italy claimed to adhere to the 1963 voluntary embargo, and those statements had been repeated subsequently by Italian representatives in United Nations forums and at international conferences.

The evidence now available indicated that in fact all that equipment had been supplied. Indeed, in the 1963 quotation he had just referred to, Italy had specifically said that it prohibited everything "including all types of ammunition". Yet the Italian reply to the Committee indicated that "no export of ammunition to South Africa has been authorized since 1972". Why, if in 1963 the Italian Government had prohibited the export of ammunition, did it now say that no ammunition had been supplied since 1972?

It was necessary to find out from Italy, in view of its admission, what type and what quantity of ammunition had been supplied to South Africa up to 1972. Moreover, the Italian Government claimed that the modern version of the MB-326K Impala I aircraft, the Impala II as it was known in South Africa, was derived only partially from the Italian prototype. Yet the South African Government stated that it was an exact model of that Italian aircraft. He had mentioned that at the Lagos Conference in 1977, and the Italian representative had denied it. Furthermore, Italy must be asked how many Rolls-Royce engines had been supplied to South Africa, what quantities South Africa had received and had stockpiled, and how many engines it had at present. Then it was necessary to find out how many AL-60 aircraft had been exported to South Africa. The Italian Government claimed that the aircraft was classified as a civilian plane for tourism, of the Piper class, and indicated that 10 planes had been exported to South Africa in 1967 and a supply of spare parts had been authorized in 1971, and that the licence for the production of the plane had not been sold to South Africa. It did not say anything about whether the export of the aircraft to South Africa was now prohibited, or indeed whether

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exports were prohibited to South Africa at all. The Italian Government said that the Piaggio P-166 aircraft was classified as a light transport plane for civilian use and that 21 planes had been sold to South Africa. It did not indicate whether any more planes had been sold since 1971, and what Italian policy was in future with regard to that aircraft. It said that the AM-3C aircraft was suitable only for liaison purposes, but the use of liaison aircraft by the South African defence force was a very serious matter. Then there was the MB-326, which the Italian Government said it had provided to South Africa along with licences for its production. The Italian Government claimed that the aircraft had been used for training purposes only, but it was a very serious matter if the Italian Government had provided South Africa with aircraft for the training of South African air force personnel.

Thus Italy had made a partial admission; he hoped that it would provide further information. The World Campaign did not believe that South Africa had the capability, entirely on its own, to make Rolls-Royce engines and many of the components for the Impala II and other aircraft which it was producing. Furthermore, two major points arose. Was it the policy of the Italian Government, or had it been up to 1972, to supply what it described as civilian planes to the South African military? In other words, had the Italian Government supplied planes willingly - despite the fact that the South African military was the end-customer - and then told the rest of the world that it did not supply any military equipment to South Africa?

The World Campaign hoped that Italy would now provide the additional information which was needed and would in future cease all forms of nuclear and military collaboration with South Africa.

On the question whether Belgium allowed some components of Mirage aircraft and other planes to be made in Belgium, he had been astonished, in the face of Belgium's statements made beforehand, to see the reply given to the Committee by Belgium that it contributed only by way of subcontracting to the manufacture of certain components for aeronautical industries in other countries. That was a clear admission that in Belgium there were plants that were making components for aircraft which were used by the South African defence industry. Yet Belgium had informed the Special Political Committee of the General Assembly that it had

complied with the relevant Security Council resolutions of 1963 and 1964 and was adhering to Security Council resolution 282 (1970). And, in Belgium's reply to the Committee, the Belgian Government stated again that Belgium was strictly applying the arms embargo. The World Campaign totally rejected the approach that a State which was making certain parts for the Mirage or any other aircraft, or continuing to service South African aircraft engines, or acting in any way as a subcontractor was implementing the arms embargo. It also wanted to know from Belgium the answers to the questions relating to the Transall aircraft engines, to which it had not replied; and it wished to know whether the Transall engines and the Mirage engines were currently serviced in Belgium. Belgium had not replied to those questions.

Israel claimed that it had ceased all collaboration with South Africa, but it had not answered the specific questions which had been asked. First, what were the relationships arising out of the Gabriel missile deal? Was South Africa now making the Gabriel missile within South Africa under licence or otherwise? How many Gabriels had been supplied to South Africa? Second, how many fast patrol boats had been supplied to South Africa and under what arrangements was South Africa now building those patrol boats inside South Africa? What technology transfer had taken place between Israel and South Africa if not licences? What other know-how had passed to South Africa in that field? Third, the Committee should be given full information about formal and official agreements in the field of electronics between Israeli industries and South African industries so that it could reach its own conclusions as to whether or not that kind of collaboration had military implications. Then there was the question of the exchange of scientists and so on, which he had already mentioned with reference to the nuclear field but which also applied in the field of conventional weapons and other security and military co-operation. He hoped that Israel would give answers to those particular questions rather than referring to general statements of denial as did many other Governments.

With regard to France, the French answer was totally inadequate. The French Government did not indicate what types of aircraft it had supplied in the past; how much ammunition; what type of ammunition; or what stocks and spares South Africa had accumulated as the result of supplies from France before the 1977 decision. France indicated that after 1977 - in other words, after the adoption of Security Council resolution 418 (1977) - all spares, ammunition and arms sales had been

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stopped. France must be asked how South Africa managed to fly the Mirages so efficiently if it was denied spare parts and had been denied them for three years? If South Africa had been provided with adequate supplies of spares and other components before 1977, it was necessary to know the quantities South Africa had been given. It would then be possible to ascertain at what stage, or after how many hours of use of the aircraft, South Africa would be searching on the black market and the international arms market for more spares and components. The question had to be put not only with regard to the Transall plane but also in relation to the aircraft supplied by the United States and the United Kingdom.

In that respect, he had been surprised to see a report in the Sunday Times of London dated 17 February 1980 to the effect that the French Government was negotiating the secret sale of £40 million worth of sophisticated arms to South Africa, using Egypt as an intermediary to hide the nature of the deal and the origin of the arms. He suggested that the Committee should look into that report. It had been his experience in the past that often reports of that kind, even though they might be inaccurate in some respects, often contained a part of the truth. It was therefore important to proceed further with the investigations.

Portugal and Spain had not answered adequately. Portugal could assist enormously by providing information about the South African weapons inventory, and also about the collaboration between Portugal and South Africa that had taken place in previous years, so that it would be possible to assess South Africa's conventional weapon capability.

The United States had provided the Committee with perhaps the longest report. But it was a matter of regret to the World Campaign that although, in its answer the United States talked about the regulations of February 1978 that prohibited the export of any goods to, or for the use of, the South African military and police - what had been foolproof rules or legislation - it was his understanding that in the new rules for the enforcement of the embargo that had come into effect in January 1980, that aspect had been watered down so that South Africa was now able to receive medicines and medical supplies. Thus the embargo, concerning which the Committee had received the report, had in fact been modified by changes made early in 1980 in the United States operation of the rules.

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The second matter to which he wished to draw the Committee's attention was the reply of the United States with regard to the L-100 and C-130 aircraft. As the Committee would recall, he had asked it to ascertain whether the spare parts for both aircraft were the same, for the World Campaign believed that they were. The United States reply confirmed that spare parts for the L-100s, some of which were compatible with the C-130s, continued to be exported to South Africa. It went on to say that United States officials were able to look at the log of spares in the case of the L-100s and presumably thus ascertain what had been diverted to the C-130s.

He wished to make the following points: first, it was a well-established fact that the L-100s had been used not only in Namibia but also in aggression against Angola and other front-line States. The aircraft had been supplied to Saifair Aviation when Mr. Kissinger had been Secretary of State. A second batch had been supplied in 1976. He personally had made representations at the time to stop the sale and had been told the aircraft were entirely for civilian use. Now that the United States was aware that between 1976 and 1980 they had in fact been used for military purposes, was not minimal action required on its part to stop shipment of the spare parts for the L-100s?

Secondly, in the procedure for checking the spare parts to make sure that the L-100 spares were not diverted to the C-130s, how could one really ascertain how many parts an aircraft used? Two tyres instead of 50 tyres? Or 50 instead of 2? The spare parts were interchangeable. If it was true that the C-130s did not have any spare parts supplied by the United States and had not had any for many years, could the United States Government please inform him how it assessed South Africa's ability to continue to fly the C-130s? What he was saying was rather simple: if aircraft were denied to South Africa, and if spare parts had been denied to South Africa since the 1960s for a particular plane, how was it that South Africa managed to still fly that plane? The United States should perhaps provide the relevant information and be more enthusiastic in tracing the indirect ways in which South Africa obtained those spare parts, if it was established that it did not obtain them via the L-100 route.

In the context of the two aircraft, there seemed to be a remarkable assumption on the part of the United States Government that a government corporation in South Africa, Saifair, would in fact work to undermine South African defence and

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implement the international arms embargo. He believed that that was too strong an assumption to make in the case of South Africa.

Regarding the United States connexion with Italian aircraft, which he had already mentioned, the United States had indicated that it allowed the aircraft engines in question to be exported to South Africa by way of Italy because the aircraft were civilian in nature. But in the cases that he had mentioned, the aircraft were in fact in the inventory of the South African Air Force. United States policy was thus being violated. In that connexion, in replying to question 4 the United States also informed the Committee that its Department of Commerce had not licensed the export to South Africa of the engines used in the Italian aircraft in recent years. He would have thought that the Committee needed to know what was meant by "recent years": the last 2 years or 10 years or 5 years?

Then there was the matter of computers. The references he had made earlier to the Digital Computer question showed the importance of ensuring that United States computers did not reach South Africa through other routes.

He welcomed the United States review of its legislation with regard to mercenaries in southern Africa. Of course, that was a question of general legislation affecting mercenaries as such, but he hoped that the United States would be able to come up with a policy position and, if necessary, legislation to ensure that mercenaries were not recruited for South Africa and did not operate in that country.

He also welcomed, in the United States response, the fact that the United States was reviewing the whole question of its military attachés in South Africa, and hoped that it would put an end to that kind of collaboration.

He was somewhat confused by the fact that on the last point mentioned by the United States, with regard to preventing the NATO codification system for spares and equipment from being supplied to South Africa, the United States had not yet obtained information on which to base its reply to the question. He was confused because he had first raised that matter in the Security Council as early as 1975 and various Governments, including that of the United States, had replied to him formally on that question.

He wished to refer that matter back to the Committee because the latter must establish why the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy and possibly other countries continued to provide South Africa with the NATO codification system for spares and equipment and, if they had ceased to do so in recent years, when they had made that decision. He knew, for example, that his representations had caused the United Kingdom Government, at least, to reverse its previous position and to deny South Africa access to the codification system. He knew too that various other NATO countries - the Netherlands, Norway, Denmark and Canada - had also given assurances of that type from the very beginning.

There was also the question of the Federal Republic of Germany. The answer from that country referred to their brochure and said nothing about the Advokaat communications system. He wished to repeat the question: how many spares continued to go to the Advokaat, and if South Africa should now require another version for a similar type of equipment for its naval forces, was it the policy of the Federal Republic of Germany at the present time to supply it?

There was probably some confusion with regard to the Sikorsky helicopters. He had mentioned that Sikorsky helicopters had been delivered to South Africa and that he had drawn the attention of the Bonn Government to that fact some three years previously. He had subsequently met with Minister von Dohnanyi in Bonn on that subject and the Minister had confirmed to him that licences had not been granted; but the aircraft were clearly in South Africa. So the reply to the Committee that no licences had been given was not the relevant answer to the problem. Again, the question he wished to ask was: how had the Sikorsky helicopters, which had been in a naval establishment in the Federal Republic of Germany, reached South Africa? If necessary, he was prepared to provide the registration numbers of the helicopters and information on who was operating them. He hoped that the Federal Republic would give the Committee more specific replies on that question.

A major issue had arisen recently in relation to the information on Space Research Corporation and the Antigua operation involving Canada, the United States, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and many other Governments such as Spain. He understood that the Committee would be hearing testimony about that case the

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following week, and the World Campaign would await both that testimony and the action taken by the Committee before sending the Committee further information. He wished to make one point, however: when the arms embargo had been adopted in November 1977, he had had the feeling that, in the long run, limited as it was, the embargo would probably operate effectively. The case of Space Research Corporation now seemed to show that the arms embargo was not working at all, because in those areas where it had worked the South African régime, together with its allies, had been able to use devious routes, often with the connivance of high-level government officials, to secure ammunition and equipment. So that matter too required urgent attention.

The question of electronics had still not been answered. Almost daily, in any defence journal one looked at, for instance, Flight International of 9 February 1980, international companies, such as Wolfsberg Electronics, which manufactured aircraft communications equipment, mentioned in bold print their South African subsidiaries and the fact that their equipment could be acquired in South Africa. If one still had any doubts, one had only to look at the South African magazine Electronics and Instrumentation and observe the many references to international companies providing military and other equipment to South Africa and offering quite openly and publicly all types of equipment to that country. The entire electronics field was inadequately covered by the arms embargo and required urgent attention. If the Committee wished, the World Campaign was prepared to supply it with further information.

Turning to the problem of increased recruitment of mercenaries for South Africa, he wished to propose that, instead of the Convention to which the World Campaign had referred in 1979 as a means of overcoming the problem, the Committee might suggest to the Security Council that it adopt a resolution outlawing the recruitment and enlistment of mercenaries for South Africa per se.

The World Campaign was still waiting for an inventory of South Africa's armaments, which it had suggested that the Committee should compile so that the world might know about South Africa's weapons capability. It was also waiting for the Committee to attend to the problem of defining what constituted "arms and related material" since, as had been seen with the Plessey case, it was constantly faced with differing interpretations by different Governments.

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There was also the whole question of the export of arms by South Africa. He had raised that issue in 1979, but the World Campaign still saw no action in the Security Council to prohibit the export of arms by South Africa, and it knew that South Africa was establishing close defence relationships with various countries, including Uruguay, Paraguay, Taiwan and South Korea and would wish to export its arms to them and to other countries.

There was also the issue of scientific co-operation. Many countries, including the four major Western countries, still had scientific attachés in South Africa. South Africa received a great deal of information useful for its military and security forces through that kind of scientific exchange.

Then there was the question of visits. There were still visits by defence personnel from various Western countries to South Africa; indeed, several countries in South America and elsewhere had even awarded medals to South African military personnel as a tribute to their military prowess.

There was also the question of oil. In 1979, he had said that, as a minimum in the context of the arms embargo, South Africa should be denied aviation fuel because the South African military and armed forces could not move without that resource.

In conclusion, he would refer to procedures. He had not really come to give the Committee any ideas as to its general work in the context of its mandate. All he wished to refer to was the area affected in terms of the World Campaign's relationship with the Committee. The World Campaign and various anti-apartheid movements had given the Committee information from time to time, and yet they did not receive information from it about how it followed up the cases concerned. That made it difficult for them to give the Committee further relevant information. Those groups did not know what happened to the cases they reported or how fast Governments responded. If the Committee would give some attention to that issue, it would help groups to ensure that both their and the Committee's work was more effective.

What seemed to be needed more than before was an analysis of the legislation of those countries which had traditionally supplied arms to South Africa, in order to implement decisions under Chapter VII of the Charter. He had been astounded to find, for example, that the Netherlands Government had no specific legislation to

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implement the provisions of Chapter VII with regard to South Africa; it simply exercised controls in terms of its general policy governing the export of arms.

There were some 15 countries at most whose legislation should be scrutinized for loop-holes. The next step would be to make representations to them to eliminate those loop-holes. So he hoped that the Committee would work quickly on that question; he would be very pleased to give any help he could.

Finally, the World Campaign was somewhat surprised to find from the Committee's annual report that so far there had not been a single case of a complaint by a Government to the Committee. He was aware that, in the case of sanctions against Southern Rhodesia, the United Kingdom and various other Governments had brought matters to the Committee concerned from time to time. Yet it appeared that, on the arms embargo question, no Government had any information about alleged violations. He knew that that was not so because the World Campaign had itself taken up issues with particular Governments. Governments had informed it about how their ships had been used to transport arms to South Africa, and had made such information public after representations by the World Campaign. Why had those Governments failed to inform the Committee about such violations of the arms embargo? Was solidarity among the Western arms-producing countries so strong that they were prepared to undermine the work of the Committee and withhold from it the information which they had acquired? He hoped, therefore, that in the next few months some Governments would inform the Committee about possible violations of the arms embargo.

The World Campaign, as the Committee knew, had been established in 1979 with the encouragement of the United Nations Special Committee against Apartheid and several African countries. It had as its patrons African Heads of State of the front-line countries as well as Nigeria and was honoured to have them involved in and supporting its work. In the past year, the Campaign had increased its co-operation with various Governments, with OAU and indeed with several Western Governments. It had tried to improve its co-operation with the Committee as well as with other relevant organs of the United Nations.

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At the present time, it had initiated a world campaign to prevent South Africa from developing a nuclear bomb and had received support from public organizations and figures in various parts of the world. He hoped that in the next few months the World Campaign would be able to increase its co-operation with the Committee.

In expressing the concern of the World Campaign regarding violations of the arms embargo, he was talking in the context of the very rapidly deteriorating and dangerous situation in southern Africa. South Africa's aggressive posture had been confirmed by recent developments. Even the recent elections in Southern Rhodesia had provoked a response from Prime Minister Botha that anyone who tried to attack apartheid would have to deal with the full might of South Africa. South Africa did not stop short of threatening or indeed acting against neighbouring African States. In such a situation, as long as South Africa and the policy of apartheid constituted a threat to peace, there must be no watering-down of the arms embargo, yet the Committee's records and the responses it had received showed some very clear cases of violations of the existing arms embargo. The arms embargo must in fact be strengthened in order to ensure that South Africa was denied all forms of military and nuclear assistance. The anti-apartheid movements believed, as did the African countries, the non-aligned countries, and indeed various Nordic countries, that it was the system of apartheid that constituted a threat to peace. But in November 1977 the Security Council had determined that it was the continued supply of arms to South Africa that constituted a threat to peace. If it was the continued supply of arms to South Africa that constituted a threat to international peace and security, why then was it that members of the Security Council, indeed three permanent members of the Security Council with the responsibility to preserve international peace and security, were so actively involved in increasing that threat to world peace by continuing their military and nuclear collaboration with South Africa? It was important to ask such questions because the public at large was unable to ascertain or to understand why it was that, when countries apparently had so overwhelmingly a commitment to the arms embargo, South Africa still continued to

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have a powerful military machine, had all the ammunition it wanted and continued to attack front-line States. The situation was not only a threat to the peace; there had been actual breaches of the peace and acts of aggression against neighbouring States. And still there was hesitation on the part of the Western countries to act more decisively.

He hoped, therefore, that the Security Council would meet as a matter of urgency to discuss the nuclear question with a view to ensuring that mandatory action was taken to ban all forms of nuclear collaboration with the apartheid régime and that the arms embargo, in so far as it covered conventional weapons and equipment as well as the other related issues that he had mentioned, was fully applied. The situation was extremely dangerous and time was running out.

He had spoken at some length, but some of the issues were technical and had taken up time. The World Campaign would send the Committee written documentation about other points in the replies which he had not mentioned in detail.

Mr. SIKAULU (Zambia) observed that Mr. Minty's excellent report was in some ways an indictment of the Committee's failure to perform its mandate effectively. The Committee must act to prevent military and, in particular, nuclear collaboration with South Africa if it was to win credibility in international eyes.

A recent article had quoted a United States Government official as observing that, after the elections in Southern Rhodesia, South Africa would become the next "theatre of action". The official had gone on to state, however, that the United States was still reluctant to recognize the gravity of the situation in South Africa, in particular developments in the nuclear field, and to impose further sanctions in the hope of persuading South Africa to grant independence to Namibia and to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The Zambian Government, for its part, shared the view expressed by Mr. Minty that South Africa's signature of the Non-Proliferation Treaty was totally irrelevant and that all forms of nuclear collaboration with South Africa must be ended. South Africa clearly intended to acquire nuclear weapons, if it did not have them already.

He wished to ask Mr. Minty to clarify his statement with regard to the Plessey contract, as it had been his own understanding that it was a purely civilian contract.

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Mr. MINTY (Director, World Campaign against Military and Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa) explained that in August 1979, the United Kingdom Foreign Office had stated that the Plessey contract was a civilian contract. On 3 September 1979, however, Lord Carrington had informed him that the contract was a combined civilian-military air control system.

It was his understanding that it had been purchased for the South Africa Air Force. According to a recent South African white paper on defence, the modernization of static and mobile defence radar systems and their integration into a modern air defence system formed part of a master plan to establish new air control systems and new bases, with the result that South Africa now had a central command and control system, to which the military had access and which had been used very effectively for South African and Southern Rhodesian raids on neighbouring African countries. The system provided under the Plessey contract would help to improve further South African surveillance at home and the control of South African aircraft abroad.

Realizing what the contract could involve, he had written to Lord Carrington on 5 September 1979 asking whether, in the light of its military implications for neighbouring African States, the United Kingdom had consulted front-line and Commonwealth African countries regarding the contract. So far, he had received no reply from Lord Carrington on the matter.

Mr. SCHLEICHER (German Democratic Republic) observed that South Africa had been able to increase its aggression against neighbouring African States only because it enjoyed Western economic and military collaboration, including nuclear collaboration. It was vital therefore that the Committee take action on the evidence furnished by Mr. Minty. The socialist countries had long warned about the international threat posed by Western nuclear collaboration with South Africa, and Security Council resolutions 418 (1977) and 421 (1977), together with the establishment of the Committee, had marked a major step towards combating that threat. The Committee had yet to fulfil its mandate, however, and should attempt to co-operate more closely with the Special Committee against Apartheid. The arms embargo against South Africa must be respected and also extended to all military sectors, and the Security Council must take action under Chapter VII of the Charter.

He wished to ask Mr. Minty whether all the evidence he had given was reproduced in the booklet produced by the World Campaign.

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Mr. MINTY (Director, World Campaign against Military and Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa) said that the details of the nuclear matters to which he had referred were contained in the nuclear booklet, but other points and proposals for action were not. He noted that his statement to the Group of Experts on South Africa's Nuclear Plan and Capability also contained many details on nuclear questions and might be of use to members of the Committee.

Mr. LØVALD (Norway) said that, while urgent efforts were clearly necessary in order to prevent South Africa from developing nuclear weapons, the dialogue had unfortunately become polarized as to the best way of achieving that objective. However, in his opinion, the differences related to approach, not to the substance of the problem.

Mr. Minty had argued in favour of a total cessation of all forms of nuclear collaboration with South Africa. However, as had been pointed out previously, another possibility lay in concerted national efforts to ensure that continued nuclear collaboration with South Africa was contingent on that country's accepting international inspection and safeguards. The imposition of such controls would reduce possible risks more than allowing South Africa to pursue nuclear development without any controls at all. If South Africa refused such controls, all forms of nuclear collaboration could then be halted. In his delegation's opinion, it was in the interest of all concerned to move closer to a common international approach to the problem and, in that connexion, full-scope safeguards offered the best solution for dealing with South Africa's nuclear ambitions.

The CHAIRMAN pointed out that, although the provisional agenda for the current meeting provided for the Committee to move into closed session in order to consider Mr. Minty's statement, that statement contained many questions of substance, technical details and proposals for action which merited considerable thought. Accordingly, it might be advisable to postpone that discussion until the Secretariat had reproduced Mr. Minty's statement in full and had distributed it to members of the Committee.

Mr. GRAHAM (United States of America), supported by Mr. LØVALD (Norway), said that when the discussion of such statements was postponed, their effectiveness was frequently diminished. Therefore, he suggested that the Committee should meet briefly in closed session in order to discuss how the Committee would approach the various matters raised by Mr. Minty's statement.

Mr. SCHLEICHER (German Democratic Republic), supported by Mr. LØVALD (Norway), suggested that the detailed report Mr. Minty had submitted to the Group of Experts should also be made available to members of the Committee.

Mr. SIKAULU (Zambia) proposed that the text of Mr. Minty's statement should be reproduced in extenso as part of the summary record of the current meeting.

The CHAIRMAN said that, if he heard no objection, he would take it that the Committee agreed to meet in closed session to discuss the procedure and to postpone the discussion of the substance of Mr. Minty's statement until the text was available.

It was so decided.

Mr. Minty withdrew.

The public meeting rose at 5.25 p.m.